By Jia Feimao | 2025-05-05

A series of high-level Chinese espionage cases has rocked Taiwan, exposing deep vulnerabilities in national security.

Beijing's infiltration has reached the Presidential Office, the Foreign Ministry and the Legislative Yuan, as well as the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), from its headquarters down to local branches.

Among the most alarming cases under investigation is that of Wu Shang-yu, a counselor in the Presidential Office.

Recruited by Chinese intelligence, Wu had joined then-Vice President Lai Ching-te's office in 2022 and followed Lai to the presidency in 2024. From this trusted position, he leaked Lai's itineraries and other sensitive internal documents.

Wu funneled the information to Chiu Shih-yuan, a DPP party staffer, who passed it to Huang Chu-jung, a special assistant to New Taipei City Councilor Li Yu-tian. Huang personally delivered the materials to Chinese intelligence in exchange for money.

Police arrested Wu, Chiu and Huang in late February and are holding them incommunicado, according to the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau.

Critical gaps revealed

Another breach struck the Foreign Ministry with the arrest of a former staffer on April 10.

Ho Jen-chieh, a former DPP staffer and assistant to National Security Council Secretary-General Joseph Wu when he was foreign minister, is suspected of leaking classified diplomatic documents since 2016.

"Many classified documents were first handed over to 'Counselor Ho' during that period," an official at the ministry who asked not to be identified told Focus.

"Looking back now, I do not know how much classified information was leaked," the official said.

At the Legislative Yuan, Investigation Bureau Director-General Chen Pai-li testified that Ho had undergone only one special security review, while Wu Shang-yu had not completed any at all -- highlighting critical gaps in counter-espionage efforts.

The third major case involves Sheng Chu-ying, whom authorities suspect of being recruited as a spy for China in 2019.

They accuse Sheng of receiving several million yuan in cash and virtual currency in exchange for providing sensitive legislative information over the past six years.

As an assistant to then-Legislative Yuan Speaker Yu Shyi-kun, Sheng breached protocol by inserting himself into diplomatic affairs, attending confidential meetings and photographing encounters with foreign dignitaries, prosecutors say.

Though dismissed from Yu's office, Sheng continued to work for other DPP legislators until his arrest March 25.

Spies in the military

Beijing's spies have also targeted Taiwan's military.

Chinese agents use bribes, blackmail and debt traps through criminal gangs, religious fronts and underground money lenders to recruit military personnel, according to an April 19 report from the Ministry of National Defense.

A National Security Bureau report in January revealed that authorities indicted 28 active duty and 15 retired service members on charges of espionage in 2023.

Though the scale has intensified, Chinese infiltration is not new.

In 2014, police investigated Chang Hsien-yao, then-vice chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, for leaks. Though authorities did not indict him then, they charged him under the Anti-Infiltration Act in February.

On April 21, the China Times cited former Military Intelligence Bureau director Liu Te-liang as estimating that more than 5,000 Chinese spies might be operating in Taiwan -- an estimate consistent with previous official assessments.

Tightening counter-espionage efforts

Taiwan currently does not require loyalty or background checks for legislative aides.

Premier Chuo Jung-tai on April 17 called for reforms, stating that future screening "may depend on the level of access an individual has to classified information."

Most of the suspects in recent espionage cases had traveled to China before their recruitment, said Chen Wen-chia, a senior consultant at the Institute for National Policy Research.

This pattern shows that Beijing's infiltration strategy "specifically targets those who have traveled to China, with both political resources and access to classified information," Chen told Focus.

Following the revelations, Lai has now ordered all DPP-affiliated officials, both in public office and within the party, to report any travel to China, Hong Kong or Macau.

Stronger laws needed

Wu Se-chih, director of the China Research Center at Taiwan Thinktank, warned, "If the government cannot defend itself, what ground does it have to demand a society-wide effort to counter infiltration?"

He urged stronger laws and dedicated courts for espionage.

"The current sentences are too light," Wu said. "They allow Communist [Chinese] spies to get away. They create a hotbed for them."

Legal inconsistencies around freedom of speech, financial tracking and classification standards continue to hinder effective investigation and prosecution, Lin Ta, a prosecutor at the Taipei District Prosecutors Office, noted.

Officials must resolve these legal ambiguities to build a stronger judicial response to espionage threats, he said, according to Taiwan's Central News Agency.

Chen the consultant echoed the need for broader awareness and strengthening of intelligence collaboration across government agencies.

Only then can Taiwan build a truly resilient and effective anti-infiltration system, he said.