By Jia Feimao | 2026-03-31

A report published in late February by the Washington-based Center for a New American Security (CNAS) recommends that Taiwan adopt a "Hellscape" defense strategy built on large numbers of low-cost uncrewed systems integrated with conventional weapons to create a multi-layered network of defensive fire.

The concept calls for combining uncrewed aerial, surface and underwater systems with land-based artillery, mines and mobile air defenses to generate a barrage of cross-domain fires that would deny the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) air and sea superiority and inflict heavy losses before forces reach shore.

Taiwan has traditionally relied on a "porcupine" strategy, but battlefield experience in Iran and Ukraine has underscored how drones are reshaping the balance between offense and defense.

The report divides the concept into four operational layers designed to progressively degrade the invading fleet's combat power at different ranges."In each tier, Taiwan can deploy uncrewed technologies to exploit the inherent challenges of an amphibious invasion, with the density and intensity of attacks increasing as the Chinese fleet approaches Taiwan's coastline," it states.

Drone saturation

In the outer layer (beginning approximately 80km from Taiwan and extending to about 40km offshore), Taiwan could deploy long-range and decoy drones alongside uncrewed surface and underwater systems and antiship missiles to conduct saturation attacks against enemy air defense systems.

The report notes that under mixed drone and missile attacks, Chinese forces would have little time to distinguish sophisticated threats from decoys and would have to engage all incoming targets. This situation would rapidly deplete shipboard interceptors, leaving the fleet increasingly vulnerable to follow-on strikes.

In the final approach phase (from about 5km offshore to the coastline), terrain constraints would force the PLA landing fleet to approach the coastline in small groups. Defending forces could then deploy short-range missiles, rockets and drones against approaching landing craft.

Drones can reinforce Taiwan's existing asymmetric defense strategy, the report says. The authors recommend expanding domestic production of uncrewed systems and adopting more-flexible operational approaches, including the establishment of "Drone Labs."

"Drones could augment Taiwan's limited stockpile of expensive weapons with precise, affordable mass," it says.

Production gap

However, Taiwan needs to ramp up drone production drastically, the report adds. It lacks a domestic industrial base capable of producing drones at scale and has institutional challenges within the military.

Taiwan produces only about 8,000 to 10,000 small drones annually, far too few for a war. The government aims to expand production capacity to 180,000 units per year by 2028.

Drawing on lessons from Ukraine, analysts say Taiwan's drone inventory would face rapid depletion in a conflict. A 2025 US Naval Institute (USNI) report says the opening phase of a conflict could "churn through thousands of [drones]" in a day.

Trying to adapt, Taiwan's military is reassessing its air defense strategy. It is emphasizing missile defense and counter-drone capabilities.

If the PLA were to lose approximately 40% of its high-value vessels while breaching multi-layered defenses, the command and combat effectiveness of its landing forces would be severely degraded, Chieh Chung, a researcher at the Association of Strategic Foresight, told Focus. That degradation would reduce the likelihood of a successful landing on Taiwan's main island.

Taiwan has already begun building elements of a "Hellscape" force structure, including deploying antiship missiles and expanding drone capabilities, a Taiwan-based military analysis platform said in March. But it questioned whether the PLA would wait for Taiwan to build up the necessary systems.

AI is essential

The key to building a "Hellscape" lies not only in deploying large numbers of low-cost drones but also in developing artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled swarm warfare capabilities, Chieh said. This plan would allow dozens or even thousands of drones to operate in coordination, divide responsibilities and autonomously identify targets. The result is high-saturation strikes at relatively low cost.

"If one intends to coordinate a large number of drones, decoys or even traditional munitions to execute a coordinated attack, one must rely on AI," he added.

Taiwan's drone swarm tactics are centered on the "Mighty Hornet" series developed by the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST). While "swarm flight" is achievable, bringing about "swarm attacks" remains a key focus for future development, Chu-Hsiang Chiou, director of the Aerospace Research Institute at NCSIST, told Liberty Times in January.