By Jia Fei-mao |
A simulation of a 2030 invasion of Taiwan by China saw Taipei refraining from firing the first shot, revealing strategic dilemmas and decision-making tensions that could well unfold in the near future.
The civilian-organized tabletop war game involving retired senior military leaders from Taiwan, the United States and Japan took place in Taipei from June 10 to 11.
The drill simulated four escalating stages of Chinese aggression toward Taiwan: harassment, coercion, punishment and full-scale invasion.
A total of nine retired generals and eight lieutenant generals formed five teams -- Taiwan, the United States, Japan, China and a control group -- each acting based on its own interests and doctrines.
![From left to right: former commander of US Pacific Command Dennis Blair; Huang Huang-hsiung, president of the Taipei School of Economics and Political Science, which organized the Taiwan Defense War Game; and former Taiwanese chief of the General Staff Lee Hsi-min, at a news conference on June 11. [Jia Fei-mao]](/gc9/images/2025/07/07/51084-wargame_tw-370_237.webp)
Set in the year 2030, the simulation imagined an economic slowdown in China and increased US-Taiwan military exchanges.
Under such pressure, Beijing opts to forcibly end the Taiwan issue. The scenario began with Chinese ships entering Taiwan's 12-nautical-mile territorial waters and seizing offshore islands as staging bases, culminating in a surprise amphibious landing on Taiwan's eastern coastline.
The drill concluded with Taiwanese forces repelling the Chinese military's eastern landing.
However, the Taiwanese team's early decisions drew sharp criticism when it did not fire at the territorial incursion or attempt to retake Pratas (Dongsha) Island, 444km southwest of Taiwan and a potential "gatekeep" to the Taiwan Strait.
The team opted for restraint to avoid escalating the conflict, Gen. Hu Chen-pu, former army commander and chief of the Taiwan team, explained.
"They want us to fire first, so they can justify attacking us," Hu said at the post-drill news conference on June 11, adding that the team's guiding principle was to avoid provocation, prevent escalation and reduce hostilities.
If Chinese ships directly approached Taiwan's landmass, opening fire would be necessary, Chieh Chung, a researcher at the Association of Strategic Foresight, said.
However, if they merely linger near the 12-nautical-mile line, Taiwan must weigh the political risks of escalation.
This conundrum mirrors real-world tensions.
If Chinese aircraft or ships enter the 12-nautical-mile zone without permission, Taiwan's military has the right to respond proportionately in self-defense, Taiwan's defense minister, Chiu Kuo-cheng, previously told lawmakers.
Invited to observe the exercise, a former defense minister, Tsai Ming-hsien, argued that Taiwan should reconsider its "no first strike" stance to avoid passivity.
He advocated for joint deterrence with the United States and Japan -- such as sanctions, expulsion or seizure of Chinese vessels violating Taiwan's waters.
The quarantine challenge
The war game spotlighted China's potential use of large-scale gray-zone operations -- coast guard, militia and civilian vessels entering the 12-nautical-mile zone -- to constrain Taiwan's military maneuvers and provoke a miscalculated response.
This strategy -- transitioning from routine exercises to actual conflict through a staged incident -- would force Taiwan into a strategic dilemma.
One key scenario was the "maritime legal quarantine," where China does not use warships but deploys its coast guard to stop Taiwan's commercial vessels, creating a de facto blockade.
Such a quarantine could be China's first move to isolate Taiwan and might compel Taipei to fire first, the US team said.
In response, the Taiwanese team adopted a "crisis management" approach -- slowing military escalation, facilitating signal exchanges and avoiding uncontrolled escalation. At sea, Taiwan attempted to shadow and contain People's Liberation Army (PLA) vessels rather than engage.
After losing Dongsha Island early in the simulation, Taiwan's team chose not to retake it.
Trying to retake Dongsha could take the battle to a geographically unfavorable position closer to the enemy, said Hu.
"We focused on whether their landing force approached the main island. We cannot let Dongsha jeopardize Taiwan's overall defense," he said.
However, he stressed that the Penghu Islands, an archipelago of 90 islands and islets about 50km west of the main island of Taiwan, must be defended at all costs.
If seized, the islands could serve as a critical logistical base for the PLA. In the drill, China first took the outlying islands of Chimei and Wang-an, then captured Penghu, dealing a major blow to morale.
Sun Ping-chung, a former deputy director of the Ministry of National Defense's Joint Intelligence Center and chief of the China team, explained the PLA's strategy: first seize Penghu to mislead Taiwan into believing the attack was from the west, then pivot to an eastern landing to disrupt Taiwan's defense plans.
China prefers "compelling surrender through war" rather than destruction, because it would need to govern Taiwan afterward, he said.
Strategic signaling
Given the broader Indo-Pacific implications, the war game included US and Japan teams.
The US side consistently showed support for Taiwan, simulating actions such as breaking the blockade and opening supply corridors.
While Japan did not deploy forces, it participated through coordination with US troops based on the US-Japan alliance framework.
In the final phase -- full-scale conflict -- both US and Japan teams simulated abandoning the "One China" policy to recognize Taiwan as an independent state.
However, US military intervention would still depend on Taiwan's own performance.
Adm. (ret.) Dennis Blair, a former commander of US Pacific Command, said the key factors for American assistance would be how the conflict begins and whether Taiwan demonstrates the capability and willingness to defend itself.
According to Blair, two factors will influence a US president's decision on whether to help defend Taiwan against a Chinese military invasion: how the conflict starts and whether Taiwan has the ability and willingness to defend itself.
Meanwhile, former Taiwanese chief of the General Staff Lee Hsi-min stressed that Taiwan's force development must be based on the assumption that no allies would come to its aid -- it must still be able to deter China on its own.
"If you don't have the will to defend yourself, why would anyone else sacrifice their young people's lives to help you?" he asked at the news conference.
![A Taiwanese military vehicle moves through Penghu on May 30, 2022. In a June war game simulating a 2030 Chinese invasion, defending Penghu was deemed critical to Taiwan's overall strategy. [Sam Yeh/AFP]](/gc9/images/2025/07/07/51087-afp__20220617__32bk3kt__v1__highres__taiwanchinauspoliticsmilitary-370_237.webp)