By Liz Lagniton | 2026-02-03

Philippine authorities and analysts are paying closer attention to Chinese diplomatic engagement with Chinese-Filipino organizations, amid concerns that Beijing is leveraging long-standing United Front networks to shape political narratives and influence communities of ethnic Chinese overseas.

The United Front is a term for pro-Beijing propaganda operations.

Last October, an organization linked in reporting to China's United Front ecosystem convened a "peaceful reunification" forum in Manila that drew more than 300 delegates, the Diplomat reported in January. Then-Philippine Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification of China (PCPPRC) president George Tiu called the Taiwan situation "complex and severe" and implored overseas Chinese to "unite as one" against "any form of Taiwan independence."

China considers Taiwan its territory and has threatened repeatedly to seize the island.

Propagandizing the ethnic Chinese minority

While China's presence in the Philippines is most visible through maritime tensions in the West Philippine Sea, analysts foresee a parallel expansion in political and social influence targeting Chinese-Filipino civic and business groups.

The West Philippine Sea has become a site of frequent confrontations between Philippine and Chinese coast guard vessels.

About 1.2 million of the Philippines' 115 million inhabitants are ethnic Chinese, though millions more have some Chinese ancestry.

Much of this activity is linked to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s United Front Work Department (UFWD) -- an apparatus designed to mobilize figures outside the CCP to reinforce its rule and support Beijing's strategic goals, such as the "reunification" of Taiwan. Chinese President Xi Jinping has famously characterized this United Front work as a "magic weapon" for advancing the party's global objectives.

Philippine officials have recently recognized that CCP influence operations, both overt and covert, are active across multiple sectors, the Diplomat reported in January. Yet, the government still fails to grasp the full scope of and interconnections among these activities, say analysts and former officials.

Public records of these activities are sparse. Engagement by the PCPPRC and similar groups largely goes unreported in English-language media, appearing instead primarily in local Chinese-language outlets, state media or embassy communications.

Always talking about Taiwan

China is fixated on turning the Chinese-Filipino community both against Taiwan and against Philippine national interests not related to Taiwan, say analysts. "The iceberg is real and it runs deep," maritime transparency NGO SeaLight director Ray Powell wrote last November, meaning Beijing's campaign to subvert Philippine public opinion.

Citing the Manila forum where Tiu denounced Taiwan's independence, Powell wrote that such influence operations are no longer just a "theoretical threat" to Philippine sovereignty.

Powell described an influence environment spanning civic events, diaspora organizations and media narratives. Some messaging now touches other Philippine interests, including the West Philippine Sea. Some video coverage of PCPPRC events disappeared after outside groups highlighted the gatherings, he said.

Meanwhile, the Diplomat's January report described participation by various individuals in multiple Filipino-Chinese civic and business organizations. One group it cites is the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Associations, whose officers include Filipino and Chinese citizens.

In mid-December, federation officials paid a courtesy call on China's new ambassador, Jing Quan. During the exchange, federation chairman Zhao Qiping described the Chinese diaspora as the "most natural and stable link" in the Sino-Philippine relationship.

The Diplomat reported too on the federation's direct engagement with the UFWD in China. During a 2024 visit to Anhui province, a group from the federation met Anhui UFWD chief Zhang Ximing, who urged them to "tell the stories of their ancestral homeland" and promote China-Philippine friendship.

Manila's limited toolbox

The Philippines has few legal tools to address coordinated foreign interference as a system rather than as isolated incidents, say analysts. Unlike Australia, which enacted foreign interference legislation in 2018 after a series of scandals, the Philippines has no comparable laws. A proposed Counter Foreign Interference Act filed in the Senate in 2024 stalled after its sponsor lost his reelection race in 2025.

Powell and other analysts emphasize the need to avoid tarring the broader Chinese-Filipino community. Many Chinese-Filipinos reject CCP political messaging and "are not confused about where their patriotic sentiment lies," Powell wrote.

But without a robust system to combat Chinese interference, the Philippines and its ethnic Chinese minority are vulnerable to continued subversion.