By Jia Feimao | 2026-01-30

Chinese harassment of Taiwanese forces continued in January in waters near the mainland.

Throughout the month, the China Coast Guard (CCG) continued to escalate "gray zone" operations around the Taiwanese-controlled Kinmen Islands. It repeatedly conducted incursions into restricted waters to test Taiwan's maritime law enforcement response and challenge the existing jurisdictional order.

Gray zone operations fall short of warfare but are meant to exhaust a country's defenses.

The January operations included four incursions, each involving four CCG vessels in two-ship formations. Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration responded with one-on-one parallel monitoring and forced the flotillas to withdraw from restricted waters, according to Taiwan authorities.

The January incidents extended a pattern of high-frequency CCG harassment around Kinmen since late 2025, reinforcing what the Taiwanese coast guard has described as so-called "law enforcement patrols" that amount to routine harassment rather than isolated acts.

George Mason University's Taiwan Security Monitor recorded 37 incidents in 2025 classified as cross-strait maritime law enforcement standoffs, most near Kinmen. They include nine that occurred during poor sea conditions. The number suggests that Beijing did not scale back operations because of weather or operational risk.

Kinmen, a group of islands that Taiwan has held since 1949, lies about 2km from China at the closest point and about 200km from Taiwan's main island. Taiwan designates surrounding waters as "prohibited" or "restricted," providing the legal basis for its maritime law enforcement and sovereignty claims.

China considers Taiwan part of its territory, denies the existence of Taiwan's prohibited or restricted waters and asserts that waters around Kinmen are China's "traditional fishing grounds."

Forcing a Chinese withdrawal

In response to CCG provocations, Taiwan's coast guard has adopted a one-on-one parallel monitoring strategy. It employs close-approach maneuvers, wave-making and "bow pressure" to deter further intrusion.

Although the vessels have water cannons and 20mm machine guns, the coast guard personnel make every effort to avoid clashes that could lead to "unimaginable consequences."

The number and tonnage of CCG vessels far exceed those of the Taiwanese coast guard.

"China is ... testing whether Taiwan is willing to bear the risk of escalation," Hung Pu-chao, deputy executive director of the Center for Mainland China and Regional Development Research at Tunghai University (Taichung, Taiwan), told Focus.

The pretense of law enforcement

China's objective is not to immediately alter sovereignty attribution but to condition all parties to operate under its rules, said Hung. It also wants international and local audiences to believe that the waters around Kinmen are Chinese.

China's deliberate decision to place CCG vessels, rather than regular naval ships, at the forefront of these operations reflects a calculated strategic choice.

"By deploying coast guard ships that represent the Chinese government and operate in the name of law enforcement, Beijing emphasizes internal order maintenance rather than external military action," Hung said. "This lowers the legal and political threshold for conflict."

Should Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration respond with excessive countermeasures, China could frame the incident as a matter for law enforcement rather than for the military, thereby undermining the legitimacy of international intervention.

Moving the parameters

Beijing routinely exploits major political disputes or unexpected cross-strait incidents to repudiate prior tacit understandings and extend its jurisdiction, Chieh Chung, a research fellow at Taiwan's Association of Strategic Foresight, said in a 2025 interview with the Liberty Times.

In August 2022, then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan, angering Beijing and leading to the "normalization" of People's Liberation Army aircraft and naval vessels crossing the Taiwan Strait median line. In February 2024, two Chinese fishermen died after falling into the sea during a pursuit by Taiwan's coast guard. The deaths gave the CCG a pretext to conduct cross-boundary "law enforcement patrols" thereafter.

Through such incrementalism, China is steadily eroding Taiwan's effective control over the waters and applying its doctrine of "lawfare," said Chieh, referring to China's misuse of international law to support its claim over Taiwan.

"When Chinese government vessels become the most stable and frequent presence exercising control in these waters over an extended period, a sense of de facto jurisdiction gradually takes hold in daily life," Hung of Tunghai University told Focus.

The preceding order is quietly replaced, and Taiwan's protests become formalities, he added.

On January 24, Taiwanese Mainland Affairs Council Minister Chiu Chui-cheng said repeated CCG incursions were "hostile and unfriendly." He urged Beijing to "reflect" and refrain from undermining cross-strait stability, according to Taiwan's Central News Agency.